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There cannot have been a more powerfully syncretistic mind in the history of Western 
philosophy than Ficino (1433-1499) , the prince of Renaissance commentators.  Rather than 
merely combining various texts and traditions, he made them speak to each other and, in the 
process, evolved a system that was both sui generis and attuned to the new ways of thinking 
that were then emerging in quattrocento Florence.  A man of immense literary and scientific 
culture, Ficino had made himself familiar with most of the philosophical texts that by his time 
were becoming increasingly available in the West.  These included, not only Plato’s dialogues 
and Plotinus’ Enneads, but also several Neoplatonic commentaries - as we now call them - as 
well as a variety of esoteric and mystical compendia.   As an ordained priest, Ficino was also 
well acquainted with the writings of the Church Fathers.  His in-depth understanding of all 
these texts, together with his ability to spot similarities, analogies and correspondences between 
them, enabled him to fuse into a coherent system various elements which a modern historian 
of philosophy would regard as dissimilar if not incompatible.  The result was achieved, whether 
deliberately or not, through a process of adjustment and, at times, alteration and transformation 
of the elements brought into the formation of the alloy.  Ficino’s syncretism stems from his 
ability to bind together doctrinal layers of various provenances.  So much has long been 
recognised.  What, by contrast, may not have been explored in sufficient detail is the manner 
in which he was led, not only to coax into compliance canonical texts of different traditions, 
but also, when he thought it appropriate, to improve on the views of those he regarded as his 
masters and to fill gaps in their arguments.   
   
Ficino’s methods of handling texts can be shown to best advantage in his most widely 
read treatise, a Latin commentary of Plato’s Symposium, entitled Commentarium in Comvivium 
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Platonis De Amore.1  By way of an object lesson, I shall here select Speech Five of the 
commentary to highlight the way in which Ficino succeeded in blending Platonic, Plotinian 
and Christian elements in the reconstruction of an argument that Plato had meant us to regard 
as flawed to the core.   First, however, some introductory remarks on the nature of Ficino’s 
syncretism are in order.   
  
1. Three Levels of Syncretism 
 
Ficino’s syncretism manifests itself at three distinct levels.  Its first and most basic level 
stems from a conception of the Platonic corpus which profoundly differs from our own.  Ficino 
did not regard Plato as the author of a philosophical system to be studied alongside other 
systems, or a set of theories that evolved over time, or indeed a world that radically differed 
from his own and challenged him in its otherness.  Plato, to whom he likes to refer as ‘Plato 
noster’, was for him the truth or, at least, a large part of the truth, and it was not a truth that he 
was inclined to question radically and openly.  For him, therefore, to read and explain Plato did 
not require placing the text in its historical, cultural or doctrinal context, or subjecting it to 
methods of internal and external criticism, which, in any case, had not yet been developed by 
his time.  From Ficino’s point of view the dialogues constituted a doctrinal monolith which had 
not been affected by whatever intellectual evolution their author might have undergone or 
which the passage of time may have made alien to later ages.  Accordingly, his mission, as he 
conceived it, was to initiate his contemporaries into the philosophy of Plato with the aim of 
enriching their worldview.  It should come as no surprise, therefore, that without any concern 
for the relative chronology of the dialogues,2 Ficino could happily hop from one dialogue to 
another, taking from one whatever material he thought useful for glossing another.  I shall refer 
to Ficino’s tendency to treat the dialogues synchronically, as a single solid block of doctrine, 
as first-level syncretism.  
    
Plato did not come alone for Ficino. To fulfil the mission of reviving the Platonic 
tradition, for which, according to tradition, Cosimo de’ Medici’ had entrusted him the direction 
                                                 
1 Ficino wrote two versions of the commentary, one in Latin, written in 1464 and published in 1469 and 
another in Tuscan, which did not come out until sixty years later.  The Tuscan version, addressed to a less learned 
audience but presenting no dramatic differences with the Latin version, was admirably translated into English by 
Arthur Farndell (2016).  Some of my translations of passages in the Latin version owe much to his skill as a 
translator.   
2 He took the Phaedrus to be Plato’s first dialogue, as many would in the following centuries. 
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of the Accademia Platonica at Careggi, Ficino availed himself of whatever help he could get 
from the many Platonic and post-Platonic writings and commentaries that had recently become 
available.  These included Plotinus’ Enneads first and foremost, but also writings by Alcinous, 
Porphyry and Iamblichus as well as commentaries on individual Platonic dialogues by Proclus 
and Hermias, all of whom treated the dialogues as a seamless body of doctrines.  Since Ficino 
studied those writings at the same time as he was translating Plato and writing introductory 
argumenta to the dialogues, it was well-nigh inevitable that he would bring post-Platonic views 
to bear on the interpretation of Plato’s writings.  This was all the more likely since the earlier 
commentators had themselves been of a syncretistic turn of mind, regarding themselves as 
‘diadochoi’ (successors), who traced their line of succession back to the ‘divine Plato’ himself.  
Ficino, who saw no reason to distrust the self-description of those he regarded as his 
philosophical forebears and mentors, took over their syncretism and became, so to speak, the 
latest of the diadochoi.   
 
The crucial role played by the so-called commentators in the transmission of Platonism 
is worth stressing in so far as present-day philosophers are fond of drawing a distinction 
between, on the one hand, philosophers, whose business it is to think, and, on the other hand, 
exegetes, whose role it is to interpret the thoughts of others.  The distinction is based on 
ignorance.  Firstly, late antique commentators took the writing of commentaries on Plato’s 
dialogues or Aristotle’s treatises as the only form of philosophical activity available to them 
since they considered that the truth on all subjects had been discovered by Plato or Aristotle, 
depending on which of the two authors they were working on.  Secondly and more decisively, 
late antique philosophers-commentators, from Plotinus to Porphyry and Proclus, who styled 
themselves as ‘Platonists,’ rarely recognised openly the extent to which they were altering the 
theories they claimed to be merely expounding.3  They did not, therefore, take the measure of 
their own philosophical originality and creativity.  So much is true even of Plotinus, the third 
and last towering giant of Western classical philosophy, who hardly ever explicitly disagrees 
with Plato, however significantly he altered - and improved - his doctrines.  A minor paradox 
of the history of philosophy, therefore, is that most of the thinkers whom we now classify as 
‘Neoplatonist commentators’ were unaware of being philosophers in their own right as well as 
followers of the vastly altered form of Platonism developed by Plotinus.4  
                                                 
3 On Proclus, see Stern-Gillet (2011). 
4 The word Neoplatonism as a classificatory term to designate the School of Plotinus was not coined until 




Ficino’s study of Plotinus was exceptionally thorough since by 1463, when he embarked 
on the translation of the dialogues, he not only had a copy of the Enneads5 to hand, but had 
also prepared for himself a manuscript in which selected passages from Plato were followed 
by what he took to be Plotinus’ comments on them.6  No doubt, the time and dedication required 
for compiling such an aid to study accounts for the strong Plotinian flavour that pervades 
Ficino’s writings and, more particularly, the paraphrases of Plotinian passages that found their 
way into his argumenta to, and commentaries on, Plato’s dialogues.  Familiarity with the 
writings of Plotinus and his successors had made Ficino well-nigh impervious to the doctrinal 
gap that yawns between Platonism and what we now call Neoplatonism.  Since he did not 
question the claims of the ‘Neoplatonic’ commentators to be faithful expositors of Plato, he 
could, without obvious qualms, help himself to the words and theories of one member of the 
familia platonica to gloss the writings of another.  Rather than explaining Plato by Plato, he 
often tended to rely on the concepts and categories of ‘Neoplatonic’ metaphysics to comment 
on whatever Platonic dialogue he was dealing with at the time.  Moreover, to the extent that 
the ‘Neoplatonic’ commentators also relied on a miscellany of mystic texts, such as the Corpus 
Hermeticum (which includes the Asclepius and the Pœmandres), the Orphic Hymns, the 
Chaldean Oracles, as well as some Neo-Pythagorean writings, all of which had become loosely 
associated with their own philosophy through the contingencies of school traditions, scholarly 
travel and political upheavals, their Platonism was Platonism vastly enlarged.  As a 
consequence, so, too, became Ficino’s Platonism, although he never lost the sense that his 
prime responsibility was to Plato’s philosophy.  Together with Plato’s dialogues, the 
‘Neoplatonic’ commentaries and associated mystico-philosophical writings made up the fertile 
soil on which Ficino’s second-level, trans-authorial, syncretism drew.   
 
As if this was not syncretism enough, Ficino went further.  Through his familiarity with 
the writings of Augustine and the Pseudo-Dionysius, he had been introduced early to a 
Christianised version of Neoplatonism.  This predisposed him to consider that Platonism in 
Plato’s or in Plotinus’ version, when he came later to encounter it, was in fundamental accord 
with Christianity.  As a consequence, he always resisted the separation of philosophy from 
                                                 
not incorrect, the appellation runs counter to the way  in which the philosophers we now call Neoplatonists 
described themselves.   
5 Laurens (2002: LXXII- LXXXIX) contains a helpfully detailed list of the contents of Ficino’s library. 
6 The manuscript, which was identified by P. Henry SJ, is described in his study of the manuscripts of 
the Enneads (1948:45-52).  On this issue, see also Laurens (2002: LXXVIII). 
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religion and thought it entirely appropriate to integrate Christian terminology in his 
commentaries on Plato’s dialogues.  Thus he had no qualms, for instance, in switching from 
Neoplatonic to Christian terminology in the space of a page of in quarto manuscript to refer to 
the ultimate ontological principle, calling it now the One and now God or even God the Father 
while making clear that it was the God of Christianity that he was referring to.  He Christianised 
the Plotinian Intellect by calling it the Angelic Mind and described what Plotinus had presented 
as the stages of emanation - from the One to Intellect to Soul to Nature - as the three faces of 
God.7   Lastly, undeterred by the risk of anachronism, or perhaps unaware of it, Ficino did not 
scruple to rely on Christian doctrines (such as creation and providence) in his interpretation of 
Plato’s texts.  He translated the traditional Greek virtues into the terminology of Christianity, 
assimilating justice, for example, as Plato and Plotinus had conceived it, to the Christian virtue 
of charity.  For these reasons, Ficino’s Plato can be described as a Plato christianus or, in 
Pascal’s somewhat cryptic remark, a Plato that ‘disposes to Christianity’.8  The co-existence of 
pagan and Christian concepts in Ficino’s writings is a manifestation of an even broader, 
because trans-doctrinal, syncretism.  I shall refer to it as his third-level syncretism.    
  
All three levels of syncretism, I shall here argue, are in evidence in the fifth speech of 
the De amore.  The main interest of the speech, I shall claim, lies in highlighting the exegetical 
problems that faced Ficino, who, for reasons of fictional coherence, found himself having to 
defend a thesis diametrically opposed to one put forward by Plato in the Symposium.  The 
exegetical acrobatics that the exercise entailed show the extent to which his multi-levelled 
syncretism gave him opportunities for being philosophically innovative.  Syncretism, as the 
example of Ficino demonstrates, need not be a symptom of a second-rate or derivative mind. 
 
2. The Speech of Marsuppini/Agathon   
 
The De amore is a fictional account of proceedings said to have taken place on the 
seventh of November 1468 at the Accademia Platonica in Careggi.9  To honour Plato’s 
birthday, assumed to have taken place on that day, seven notables sat down to a banquet during 
                                                 
7 See De amore, V4.46 and 11. passim. 
8 ‘Platon pour disposer au Christianisme’, Pensées 612.  On the issue of Ficino’s Christianised 
interpretation of Plato, see, e.g., Marcel (1958) and Magnard (2001). 
9 Such, at any rate, is the information given by Ficino himself in the opening paragraph of Speech 1, but 
historians now dispute the accuracy of the claim.  What is certain, pace Ficino, is that the tradition of celebrating 
Plato’s assumed birthday, far from ending with Porphyry as he claimed, was still alive in Proclus’ time (412-485 
CE), as attested by his In Platonis Rem Publicam Commentarii. 
6 
 
which Plato’s Symposium was read.  The reading was followed by speeches given by the guests 
in turn, each of which consisted in a commentary on one of the speeches in the original.  Ficino 
gave himself the role of fictional amanuensis whose presence was necessary to record the 
proceedings.  As the occasion demanded, the speeches were deferential to the standpoint of the 
original Platonic speaker.  Accordingly, Marsuppini,10 the latter-day Agathon, began by 
praising the ancient Agathon for his careful (cf. diligenter) enumeration of the properties of 
Love as a deity (Erōs) and his description of the benefits that he bestows upon humankind.  
Marsuppini’s approval is grounded, not, as might have been expected, in the pivotal role that 
Agathon’s speech plays in the economy of the dialogue - it provides an opening and a foil for 
Diotima’s own - but, more surprisingly, in the very substance of Agathon’s central claim, 
namely that, of all the gods, Erōs is the happiest, most beautiful and best (beatissimus, 
pulcherrimus et optimus, V,8).   
 
The exegetical challenge that faced Ficino at that point was to combine the definition 
of love that he was putting in the mouth of Marsuppini with the opposite viewpoint that Plato 
had ascribed to Socrates/Diotima.  In having Marsuppini re-interpret the ancient Agathon’s 
claim that Love (Erōs) is perfect, Ficino ran counter to Socrates/Diotima’s presentation of him 
as a daimon, whose parentage - father poros (inventiveness) and mother penia (poverty) - had 
made needy by nature and forced to be forever in search of what he lacks.  Since the daimonic 
character of Love is the lynchpin of the Symposium, Ficino’s deviation from the Platonic stance 
cannot be over-stressed, all the more so since Agathon’s initial failure to recognise the strength 
of Socrates’ counter-arguments has led most readers of the dialogue to dismiss Agathon’s 
speech as a vapid piece of Gorgianic rhetoric, and Agathon himself as a feather-brained 
belletrist.  How was Ficino to proceed if he was to rehabilitate the views of the ancient Agathon 
while remaining true to the thesis of Socrates/Diotima, which had almost certainly been Plato’s 
own view?  
 
Let it first be noted that although Marsuppini presents his argument as a defence of 
Agathon’s eulogy of Love (Erōs), he begins by departing from it in several ways, as he does 
also from Diotima’s definition of beauty.  The love that Marsuppini praises at the start of his 
speech is not the individual divine being that Agathon had made it out to be, but an impersonal 
                                                 
10 Carlo Marsuppini (1399-1453), author of poems and letters, became Chancellor of the Republic of 
Florence.  His brother, Cristoforo Marsuppini, the fictional author of Alcibiades, Speech 7.  For the information 
on the set-up of the De amore, see Robichaud’s detailed account (2018: 113-122). 
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force that exerts its attraction at both the worldly and the other-worldly level.  As for beauty, 
the paradigmatic object of love, Ficino/Marsuppini presents it, not as a transcendent Form 
variously instantiated in the world below, as Plato had taught, but as a property.  While it is 
reasonable to assume that Ficino modified Agathon’s position to make it compatible with his 
own conception of the divine, it is not so easy to understand why he distanced himself from 
Plato/Diotima’s definition of beauty as a Form.  Could it have been because Plato had not been 
univocal on the relationship between the good and the beautiful, either in the Symposium or 
elsewhere?11  Although he had consistently presented them as separate Forms, albeit internally 
linked, Plato had sometimes intimated that they are identical (Meno, 77b6-7 and Timaeus, 
87c4-5) while, at other times, implying that they are different (Philebus, 64e5-6), and leaving 
the Beautiful out of account in his description of the role of the Good in book VI of the 
Republic.    
 
Perhaps because of Plato’s unclarity in the matter, Plotinus had not conceived of the 
good and the beautiful as Forms.12  In this Ficino followed him.  He made Marsuppini remark 
that common usage (cf. dicimus) takes the beautiful and the good to be separate properties; 
while the beautiful is assumed to stem from outer perfection or harmony (perfectio exterior) 
between perceptible component parts, the good consists in inner perfection or harmony 
(perfectio interior) between states of the soul.  Through a series of examples, which include 
perceptible and non-perceptible objects at the peak of their beauty, Ficino has Marsuppini 
qualify common usage and argue that beauty in its purest form cannot but be the outward 
manifestation or blossom (flos) of goodness.13  In thus unobtrusively building a normative 
element into his concept of beauty, Ficino/Marsuppini paved the way for the defence of what 
will be the central claim of his speech, namely that beauty, once it is conceived as an 
incorporeal property, leads the soul to the transcendental fount of all goodness.  Although 
reminiscent of Diotima’s scala amoris, the move required delicate adjustments on Ficino’s 
part, who had to make it compatible with both Agathon’s pagan view of love and Christian 
doctrine.  The consummate skill with which he modifies Agathon’s thesis constitutes the main 
source of interest in a speech that might otherwise have been an insipid piece of rhetoric. 
 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Barney (2010) and Riegel (2014). 
12 On this issue see Stern-Gillet (2000). 
13 In so far as flos is the Latin equivalent of the Greek anthos, it is a likely borrowing from the Orphic 
Hymns, 59 or the Chaldean Oracles, 37 and 42. 
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3.  The incorporeal nature of beauty 
 
The issue was delicate.  Had it not been for his commitment to the defence of Agathon’s 
conception of love as a deity, Ficino/Marsuppini could have turned for (limited) philosophical 
support to Diotima’s claim that the quality of love is proportionate to the worth of its object 
and that worth, in this case, is to be measured by the degree of detachment from the physical 
nature.  Syncretism, however, supplied Ficino with alternative arguments.  As his belief in the 
monolithic nature of the corpus encouraged him to do, he turned to the Timaeus, a dialogue 
likely to have been composed later than the Symposium.  In that dialogue Plato had drawn a 
distinction between, on the one hand, sight and hearing and, on the other, touch, taste and smell 
(47a-d).  While the first two senses, he had argued, enable us to apprehend objects at a distance, 
the other three confine us to the immediate vicinity; while the first two senses serve the august 
function of empowering reason and fostering the development of learning, the other three play 
the humbler role of enabling the body to function as its nature dictates.  From the Timaeus, 
therefore, Marsuppini could infer that sight and hearing have a natural affinity to the soul and 
that, like truth and virtue, they hold intrinsic worth for it.  By contrast, the value that the soul 
in us attaches to the other three senses is merely instrumental to the fulfilment of its role as 
minister of the body.  In line with the negative theorisation of the body that Plato had defended 
in early dialogues such as the Phaedo, Ficino/Marsuppini concluded: 
.. odours, savours, heat, and the like either harm the body a great deal, or help it, 
but they present little either to the admiration or to the censure of the soul, and are 
only moderately desired by it.  On the other hand, the reasons present in incorporeal 
truth, colours, shapes and sounds move the body either not at all or with difficulty 
and very little.  But they greatly sharpen the edge of the soul for inquiry and 
research (indagandum), and they attract its desires to themselves.14  
Natural allies of the soul, the specific objects of sight and hearing foster its ability to think 
beyond the here and now.  In so doing, they sharpen its desire to ascend to greater degrees of 
beauty.  The step was crucial to Ficino/Marsuppini’s aim to demonstrate that true beauty is an 
incorporeal light of divine origin.   
 
                                                 
14 V 2.42, trans. Jayne, modified.  Other translations from Ficino’s Latin are mine, sometimes indebted 
to Arthur Farndell.   
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Plotinus’ description of the formation of aesthetic judgments provided Ficino with the 
next step in his argument.  In Ennead I 6 [I], Plotinus had argued that aesthetic judgments are 
the products of the application of principles (logoi) held in the soul to physical objects 
perceived by the sense organs.  Judgements of beauty are formed, he wrote, ‘by fitting the 
beautiful body to the form in itself and using this for judging beauty as we use a ruler for 
judging straightness’ (I 6 [I] 3.3-5).  More generally, he continued:  
When sense-perception, then, sees the form in bodies binding and mastering the 
nature opposed to it, which is shapeless, and shape riding gloriously upon other 
shapes, it gathers into one that which appears dispersed and brings it back and takes 
it in, now without parts, to the soul’s interior and presents it to that which is within 
as something in tune with it and fitting it and dear to it.  (3.9-15) 
In the emanative ontology of the Enneads, the logoi in question are traces (typoi) left in the 
soul by the higher reality from which it is emanated, namely Intellect and the Forms.  The 
Forms, as Plotinus conceived them, are archetypes of objects in the world of sense and 
paradigms for the human soul on its way to virtue.  According to Plotinus’ conception of 
aesthetic judgments, therefore, the embodied soul that apprehends beauty, even in its humblest 
form, brings itself closer to the archetype of beauty.  It served Ficino’s strategy, therefore, to 
agree with Plotinus that the focus of aesthetic interest lies, not in the materiality of its object, 
but in such reflected properties as are received by the soul of the beholder.  As he had 
Marsuppini conclude:  
The beauty of any person pleases the soul not insofar as it lies in external matter, 
but insofar as an image (imago) of it is apprehended or grasped by the soul through 
sight ... The soul can only like the beauty which it has taken in. Though this beauty 
may be an image of an external body, it is nonetheless incorporeal in the soul.15  (V 
3. 43-44)  
 
As Ficino knew better than anyone else in his time, Plotinus’ conception of aesthetic 
judgments has deep roots in his system, stemming as it does from a combination of a highly 
complex theory of sense-perception16 and a concept of matter that is inimical to the view that 
beauty can be predicated of sensory objects.  Taking the first point first, I shall now suggest 
                                                 
15 ‘Placet animo persone alicuius speties, non prout in exteriori iacet materia, sed prout eius imago per 
visum ab animo capitur vel concipitur ... Placet utique animo ea dumtaxat speties que ab illo suscipitur.  Hec 
autem licet exterioris corporis simulacrum sit in eo tamen est incorporea.’  All references to, and quotations from, 
the Latin text, are in Laurens (2002) edition. 
16 On this issue, see Emilsson (1988) and Stern-Gillet (2017). 
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that Plotinus’ theory of sense-perception, as well as the principle of causation from which it 
derives, were decisive in leading him to conceive of beauty as first and foremost a metaphysical 
property.  No emanated entity, he taught, can initiate changes in the reality from which it is 
emanated.  The paradoxical implication of this principle is that the embodied soul is impassible 
(apathēs) and cannot therefore receive affects (pathē) coming from the world of sense.  To 
lessen the paradox and account for the everyday reality of sense-perception, Plotinus postulated 
the existence of judging agencies, vested in the imagination and the sense organs themselves, 
to function as go-betweens and process the data of sense so as to make them accessible to the 
soul in us.  Only when so processed, he held, can sensory objects be assessed for their aesthetic 
merit by the soul.  Although Plotinus’ conception of sense-perception would have been of direct 
help to Ficino in his attempt to demonstrate the incorporeality of beauty, he may have thought 
it too abstruse and counter-intuitive to be included in the relatively light-hearted context of a 
sympotic speech.  Conceivably, he may also have judged it to be philosophically flawed, as did 
many a later reader of the Enneads.  Whatever his reason for ignoring that aspect of the 
philosophy of the Enneads, Ficino agreed with Plotinus’ view that the judgement of beauty 
bears, not on physical objects, but on an abstracted or ‘spiritualised’ version of them.  It 
provided additional support for Marsuppini’s contention that beauty is not of this world.    
 
In focusing the speech on the incorporeality of beauty, Ficino was also drawing on 
Plotinus’ disparagement of the world of sense.  Our world, Plotinus taught, is not a 
metaphysically independent entity which can be understood as such, but the product of the 
formative action of soul upon matter.  In so far as matter is produced at the point at which the 
emanative process has all but exhausted itself, it is inherently sterile and, as such, contrary to 
the power of all things, namely the One or Good.  Shapeless, formless, indeterminate and 
altogether without quality, matter is the passive recipient of such logoi as the descending soul 
retains within itself at that stage and projects upon it as typoi (traces).  In presenting the world 
of sense as resulting from the projection of images of the Forms onto insubstantial matter, 
Plotinus in effect ruled out that it could be beautiful in itself.  As he put the point in one of his 
most telling metaphors, that world is ‘a corpse adorned.’17  
 
                                                 
17 On Matter (II 4 [12]) 5.18.  However, as testified by the more positive view of the physical world 
that he presents throughout Ennead IV 8 [6], Plotinus does not unfailingly disparage the world of sense. 
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The action of the Plotinian Soul on matter, it should be noted at that point, is not to be 
understood either on the model of Aristotle’s efficient cause or, even less, as an act of creation.  
Unlike Aristotle’s efficient cause, the descending soul of the Enneads does not transform 
matter into something that it had not been before, and, contrary to the teachings of the 
Abrahamic religions, soul does not bring matter into being.  All the Plotinian soul does is to 
emanate matter as part of an eternal and necessary process that unfolds from the One.  Covering 
matter with such traces of the Forms as it retains at that point, the descending soul makes matter 
the substrate of a world of semblance.  So doing, the soul may well disguise the abjectness of 
matter and thus fools a superficial eye, but the truth of the matter is that soul can never make 
matter anything other than a mere image deprived of ontological density.   
 
As a committed Christian and a priest, Ficino could not endorse Plotinus in his 
metaphysical and aesthetic depreciation of the world of sense.  To have done so would have 
amounted to blasphemy since he regarded that world as the product of divine creation through 
the intermediary, respectively, of the Angelic Mind and the Soul.18  The difference in 
terminology notwithstanding, the two philosophers agreed that although Forms (or Angels) are 
paradigms of beauty, they are not the ultimate fount of it.  Plotinus had reserved that role for 
the One, generator of being (gennētēs, V 2 [11] 1.7), from which all things are eternally 
emanated.  In Ficino’s Christianised version of the One, therefore, the fount and origin of 
universal beauty (pulchritudo universalis) is God the Father, creator of both the visible and the 
invisible universe, and whose power transcends all.  ‘Beauty’, he wrote, ‘is the name we give 
to the grace of the divine face (divini vultus)’ (V 4.47).  In keeping with the emanative structure 
that he had taken over from Plotinus, Ficino distinguished stages in God’s diffusion of beauty 
into his creation and taught that the divine creative ray makes its power and radiance felt in 
descending order of luminosity, first in the souls of the angels, then in those of human beings, 
before reaching the constituents of the world of sense:   
In its mercy, the divine power, transcending all, imbues the cosmos, the angels, and 
the souls it has created (as if they were his children) with its ray, in which there is 
the fertile power to create anything (V 4. 46) 
                                                 
18 Ficino was aware of having altered Plotinus’ terminology: ‘The Platonists call this kind of pictures in 
Angels forms or ideas, in souls reasons and concepts, in the matter of the world forms and images’ (V 4.46 ).  Let 
it here be noted, parenthetically, that in making Forms or Angels exemplars of which the human soul bears the 
traces within itself and uses in the formation of aesthetic judgments, Plotinus and Ficino introduced into Western 
philosophy an idealist theory of beauty which was to prove influential on both Renaissance and post-Renaissance 
art theory as well as on later philosophical aesthetics, from Kant to Collingwood.    
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What we take to be the beauty of the physical world, therefore, is for Ficino/Marsuppini but a 
reflection of the ‘grace of the divine face,’ which is incorporeal by definition.  As he wrote 
with typical stylistic flourish, ‘those who thirst for beauty ... must look elsewhere than in the 
river of matter or the rivulets of quantity, shape, or colours of any kind, to find the sweetest 
drink of the beauty that would assuage their thirst.’ (V 3. 46)  Shorn of its connections with the 
physical world, Ficino’s concept of beauty could  at that stage be enlarged to include 
excellences of the soul, such as the virtues.       
 
  This brought Ficino, once again, in agreement with Plotinus.  Despite their doctrinal 
differences on the origin of the world of sense, the two philosophers were at one on the 
normative implications for individual human souls of the incorporeal nature of beauty.  Being 
twice removed from the divine source of light and burdened by their function as ministers of 
body, these souls, they held, are prone to be oblivious of their higher nature and to yield 
indiscriminately to the demands of body.  So doing, they confine themselves to the here and 
now of the world of appearances; labouring under the mistaken assumption that beauty lies in 
physical appearances, they blind themselves to the presence in their inner self of a spark of the 
higher reality from which they come.  Self-forgetfulness was the diagnosis that both 
philosophers gave of the disease of a soul that involves itself excessively with the body.  In 
Plotinus’ words:  
What is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant 
of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from the higher 
world and altogether belong to it? (V 1 [10] 1.1-3) 
The remedy that he advocated for the self-forgetful soul was to turn its attention inwards and 
to engage in a process of self-purification designed at liberating itself, so far as it could, from 
the bodily nature.19  While keeping the body functioning, a purified soul, he was confident, 
would become conscious of the traces of the higher world that it bears within itself and of its 
own place in the emanative process.20     
 
Like Plotinus, Ficino identified care for the body as the main cause of the apostasy of the 
soul.  Unlike him, he suggested that the use of reason would be curative:   
                                                 
19 For the moral advice that Plotinus gives to embodied human souls, see the famous purple passage in 
the tractate On Beauty (I 6 [1] 9) on the theme of ‘working on your statue,’ as well as the tractate On Virtues (I 2 
[19]) in its entirety. 
20 See, e.g., Ennead V I [10] 2. 
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 ... our soul, being created in a state so as to be enveloped by an earthly body, tends 
downwards to serve the body; and once it is weighted down by this tendency, it 
neglects the treasure hidden in the deepest part of itself. ... As result, it comes about 
that the soul fails to see the light of the divine face which shines unceasingly within 
it, until the body becomes fully grown and reason is awakened: then it contemplates 
in thought the face of God which is reflected in the structure of the world and is 
obvious to the eyes.  Through such contemplation the soul is led to apprehend the 
face of God which shines within it ’ (V 4.47) 
In these lines, we hold the core of Ficino/Marsuppini’s speech, both thematically and 
exegetically.  As the above quoted lines from Ennead V I [10] show, the claim that over-
attentiveness to the body makes the soul oblivious of its true self is Plotinian, while the phrase 
‘treasure in its heart’ is, most probably, a reminiscence of Augustine’s famous apostrophe to 
the deity in the Confessions (III, 6,11): ‘You were deepest within me and higher than the highest 
part in me.’21  Ficino’s choice of phrase expresses his conviction that human souls, as creatures 
of God, are illuminated from within by a spark of the divine ray.  As for the remedy that would 
reverse the self-oblivion of the soul, Ficino proved to be more optimistic than Plotinus had 
been.   Rational maturation, he held, can lead the soul to the realisation that the physical beauty 
it admires is in truth immaterial since it is received through the intermediary of an immaterial 
medium, namely light:   
Therefore, since the light of the sun is incorporeal, whatever it receives, it receives 
according to the mode of its own nature, and so it receives the colours and shapes 
of physical objects in a spiritual way.  It is in the same way that light is received by 
the eyes.  And so it is that the whole beauty of this world, which is the third face of 
God, presents itself to the eyes as incorporeal, through the incorporeal light of the 
sun. (V 4. 48)22     
As is evident in these lines, Ficino had taken over Plotinus’ assumption that light is 
immaterial.23  Whether he could have known that the assumption was erroneous is uncertain.  
What at any rate is clear is that he drew metaphysical mileage from the analogy since he 
concluded at that point that the focus of aesthetic interest is not the object in its materiality nor 
                                                 
21 For further medieval sources of this particular Ficinian view, see Laurens (2002:285, n.26).  
22 ‘Cum igitur solis lumen incorporeum sit, quicquid suspicit nature sue suscipit modo.  Propterea colores 
et figuras corporum modo suscipit spiritali.  Eodemque pacto ipsum ab oculis susceptum inspicitur. Quo factum 
est ut totus hic mundi decor, qui tertius est dei vultus, per incorpoream solis lucem incorporeum sese oculis 
offerat.’ For Plotinus’ statement of the same view, see, e.g., tractates II 1 [40] 7 and VI 4 [22] 7].  
23 For a list of Plotinus’ references to light, see Ferwerda (1965: 46-55). 
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the person in his corporeality, but the representation or image of them that is received in the 
beholder’s soul.   
  
 
4. Agathon redux 
 
Ficino’s reinterpretation of Agathon speech was nearly complete at that point.  All that 
remained for him to do was to explain that beauty, as he had re-interpreted it, can be a force of 
attraction and an object of love.  This had presented no difficulty for Agathon in whose view 
Erōs is a young and physically attractive individual deity.  Ficino, who must have known that 
his conception of beauty as incorporeal made it more difficult to account for the pull it exerts 
on human souls, enlisted the help of etymology, philosophical tradition and theological 
doctrine in his attempt to deal with the issue.    
 
 He turned first to etymology and had Marsuppini remind his fellow symposiasts that in 
the Cratylus Socrates had been made to note that kallos (beauty) derives from kalein (to call). 
Making Marsuppini trust the etymology,24 Ficino had him claim that true beauty calls the soul 
to itself, as is testified by the intrinsic value that most human beings attach to harmonious 
sequences of sounds, graceful bodily proportions and, more crucially, moral virtue (V 2.42).  
Having granted incorporeal beauty the capacity to urge the soul onto the path of moral 
goodness, Marsuppini was able to argue that it also has the power to attract love.  As had 
already been noted earlier on in the De Amore, ‘When we say “love,” understand “the desire 
for beauty, for this is the definition of love among all philosophers.”’ (II,4)  By ‘all 
philosophers,’ Ficino meant ‘all philosophers in the Platonic tradition,’ whom he regarded as 
the very emblems of philosophy.     
 
At this point, the elements were in place for him to clinch the main argument of Speech 
V.  He made Marsuppini argue that since each individual human soul is a mirror reflecting the 
divine face, human beings are naturally drawn to the original of which they bear traces in their 
inner self and perceive the reflections in the outside world.  The true object of human love, he 
could then finally conclude, is the fount of all beauty, God the Father, creator of all things.  For 
                                                 
24 The use of the etymology has no backing in Plotinus, who may have suspected it to be fanciful.  
Chantraine, vol. III (1968: 487) describes it as ‘unknown’. 
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once he made Marsuppini put the point in simple terms, ‘a father’s face is a welcome sight to 
his children’ (V 4.47).  Unfortunately, the argument that had been put in his mouth is circular.25 
Ficino, who is likely to have realised this, sought to bolster it by turning to Christian doctrine.  
He made the human ability to love into a gift from God who, in his providential goodness 
(benignitas providentiae, V,10), eternally bestows it on his creatures, from the Angels to 
individual human beings.  Those who truly love beauty, therefore, have the capacity to elevate 
themselves to the divine and thus to fulfil the ideal of god-likeness, as famously conceptualised 
in the interlude in Plato’s Theaetetus.     
 
 And so, finally, the question may be asked as to whether Ficino had succeeded in 
vindicating Agathon’s conception of love.  ‘Partially but not entirely’, must be the verdict.  To 
the extent that he successfully combined canonical texts in the Platonic tradition with the 
teachings of Scripture, he can be said to have mounted an argument that exceeded in cogency 
and sophistication Agathon’s own efforts to demonstrate a similar thesis.  More specifically, in 
presenting love as a divine gift to humankind, he made Agathon emerge partially vindicated 
from the re-interpretation of his speech.  However, he had had to make too many adjustments 
to Agathon’s original position for the vindication to be complete.  The Erōs of the young 
playwright’s description had to be transformed almost beyond recognition; no longer a youthful 
and physically attractive deity dwelling on Mount Olympus, he had become at Ficino’s hand a 
gift to humankind from the Creator and a manifestation of His providence; no longer a 
paradigm of beauty conceived on the human model, he had become a light of preternatural 
beauty; no longer ‘the leader in festival, chorus and sacrifice’ (Symp. 197d3), fêted in pagan 
rituals, he had become the deity to whom human souls must pray.  
 
 Syncretism would never go further or be more historically fruitful.26   
 
University of Manchester and University of Bolton 
   
 
                                                 
25 Ficino would have been better inspired to turn to Plotinus’ tractate On Love III 5 [50] 3.11-13, where 
the point is made more effectively if less clearly: ‘So from the power which is intensely active about the object of 
vision, and from the kind of outflow from that object, Love came to be as an eye filled with its vision, like a seeing 
that has its image with it.’ 
26  Thanks are due to Arthur Farndell, Kevin Corrigan, Valery Rees and Christopher Strachan for 
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